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              Research Question  
 
Does foreign investment, as a form of soft power, influence a liberal democracies rhetoric 
towards human rights violators? 
 
                                                                   Abstract 
This research project examines the question of whether or not foreign investment from 
countries who are known human rights violators influences the rhetoric of the receiving countries 
towards these violations. Background and data were culled from both qualitative and quantitative 
sources including both academic and scholarly works as well as both primary and secondary 
sources of empirical data. The dependent variable examined was the position and attitudes of 
recipient countries towards said violations. The independent variable examined was foreign 
investment from countries with known human rights violations. This project determined that 
liberal democracies who receive a significant amount of foreign investment from a country with 
known human rights violations tone their rhetoric towards the violating countries' transgressions. 
The primary example recipient countries were the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece and 
the primary investor country was the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Germany and Greece are 
members of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accordingly, 
their attitudes towards PRC human rights violations are both telling and present both the possibility 
of foreign influence being exerted via foreign investment and this influence potentially presenting 
a threat to these alliances via conflict of interest. This influence likely is resultant from a deliberate 
soft power strategy on behalf of the PRC, as such, this paper provides insight into the influence of 
foreign investment on recipient country attitudes towards the investor country as well as revealing 
a systemic and deliberate approach to power projection and acquisition of new spheres of influence 
by one country towards another. 
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 This research project examines the influence of foreign investment on a recipient country, 
specifically whether or not countries who receive investment from foreign countries, who are 
known human rights violators, change rhetoric towards the investor country as a result. This 
question is an important one beyond what, prime fascia, appears obvious. There should, of 
course, be moral frameworks for the ethical conduct of transnational business to include all 
forms of investment from a foreign government. Globally countries who routinely violated 
agreed-upon human rights conditions are punished for these transgressions. Cuba, North Korea, 
and Iran are three salient examples of the punitive consequences, including sanctions and 
embargoes, of running astray from these norms. While the research question uses human rights 
and a recipient countries rhetoric towards the investor country, these attitudes and policies 
towards human rights are an overt indicator of the scale and scope of influence that foreign 
investment has. What this may signal, and why this question is so important, is that if a recipient 
country overlooks what would be egregious human rights violations, what else might they be 
willing to overlook or otherwise ignore? This has geopolitical implications as countries who 
routinely violate human rights are themselves likely authoritarian and otherwise in opposition to 
western liberal values.  
 Delving into this question, this paper examines foreign investment as an instrument of a 
foreign policy strategy. Foreign policy’s power projection arm intimates itself through two 
primary vehicles: hard power and soft power. The former is the physical manifestation of a 
country's military and financial might, i.e. force, and the latter is hands off, influence via 
attraction and persuasion.1 The latter option, while not as overt and severe, encompasses similar 
 





consequences and outcomes in the long term. Joseph Nye, the conceptual father of soft power 
makes the delineation between that and its counterpart: “hard power can rest on inducements, 
“carrots”, or threats, "sticks", but sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible 
threats or payoffs”.2 This strategy is what he deems the “second face of power” and as such it co-
opts as opposed to coerces.3  The key element, as it pertains to this research project, is not the 
direct means to make an actor acquiesce, but in the ability to achieve one actor's purpose by 
impacting the behavior of another. In this respect both hard and soft power are connected, 
however soft power and its co-optive nature can shape what others want, and critically has the 
ability, as Nye states, to “manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes 
others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic”.4  The approach 
logic is therefore that foreign investment is a tool and function of soft power and can, in some 
cases, be used by countries to impart compliance with non-western and even authoritarian views.  
 Accordingly, this paper will attempt to answer the research question by utilizing a case 
study approach to foreign investment as a vehicle of influence; while influence and ultimately 
power projection are the logical end states of such strategies, conceptually the strategy itself falls 
within Nye’s definition of soft power. To frame this approach Nye states that soft power rests 
upon three resources: culture, in places where it is attractive to others; political values, when 
lived up to at home and abroad; and foreign policies, when seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority.5 While Nye argues effectively for all three resources influencing soft power this 
research project posits that foreign investment is a fourth resource which drives soft powers co-
optive nature. While this can be traced readily through time, to make this paper relevant and 
 
2  Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5. 
3 Ibid, 5. 
4 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 7. 




current, one investor country will be examined, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and three 
of its soft power vehicles: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), its Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), 
and Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure (FDII) in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). On the recipient end, both the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece's foreign 
investments from the PRC will be examined. This is not at random as both countries have seen 
significant investment from the PRC in the past decade and have been prominent for their 
attitudes, and chiefly their language, regarding PRC human rights violations, prior to and 
following receiving Chinese investment. In examining Germany, current Chancellor Angela 
Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, employed what was deemed Chinapolitik when dealing 
with the PRC. Chinapolitik, at its core was driven primarily by economic interests as Schröder 
promoted “closer trade ties and cooperation with China, while ignoring, or at best doing little 
more than paying lip-service to, normative aspects of German foreign policy such as the 
promotion of democracy and human rights.” 6 Schröder consequently took much criticism for 
this practice, so much so that Merkel, upon taking the chancellorship, made it policy to practice 
Mut zu kritischen To¨nen (having the courage to raise critical issues), which was and is a 
“rhetorical commitment to a value-driven foreign policy towards China.”7 Has she made good on 
her policy, and has the enforcement of human rights truly take precedence over economic 
interests? Similarly, Greece, as an EU member, and one with strategically vital sea access from 
the Mediterranean as well as significant economic woes, has it upheld a defense of human rights 
in light of its investments from the PRC? Is PRC foreign investment resulting in a co-optive 
 
6 Felix Heiduk, “Conflicting Images? Germany and the Rise of China,” German Politics 23, no. 1-2 (2014): pp. 118-133, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2014.916693) 




dynamic and if so, does it influence developed countries, especially ones with an advanced 
democratic system? This paper will lay primary focus into answering these questions.  
Literature Review 
 
 Foreign investment, in its various forms, has been both an important economic as well as 
political tool since the late 18th Century. As the economy has globalized and both international 
commerce and finance have grown to mark significant factors in a nation's gross domestic 
product (GDP), the financial interactions relating from foreign investment have taken on vital 
importance to both the investor and recipient counties alike. Capital in the form of loans, and for 
infrastructure development and its associated economic development, play crucial roles for a 
recipient country. In the modern globalized world, it is critical for nations to not only provide 
domestic economic strength but to compete and project a similar strength in the global 
marketplace. This, in theory, affords an investor country with a great deal of leverage which, in 
great enough quantity, is political power in the form of direct and indirect influence. The latter is 
more insidious but will usually reveal itself in the behavior(s) of the recipient country in the 
political discourse with a respective investor country and possibly in their foreign policy towards 
this actor. The simple observation here is that recipient countries have a motive to ensure goos 
relations with investor countries, with this dynamic in mind, and within the limits of a recipient 
countries counties own self-interest, what would it be willing to tolerate, within reason, to assure 
these investments? Accordingly, it is important to examine the history of international 
investment, the theory of power with regards to international relations theory, the tools of foreign 
investment, and if they are indeed tools of soft power. 
  As Kenneth J. Vandevelde explains in A Brief History of International Investment 




the Colonial Era, encompassing the periods of the late 18th century to the end of the Second 
World War; the Post-Colonial Era, encompassing the latter period through the cold war and 
ending upon the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1990; the third, and present period, deemed the 
“Global Era”, began after the Soviet Union’s collapse and continues through today.8 These 
periods themselves displayed transformative elements and can be considered the developmental 
stages upon which foreign investment was built. The Colonial era, when the “community of 
nations” was largely relegated to European powers and the nascent confederation of states in 
America, it was largely accepted that in regard to “protecting states interests, customary law or 
even military force was the primary means of protecting foreign interest”. 9 In the Post-Colonial 
Era, these former colonies achieved political independence and accordingly military force was 
no longer a legitimate  overt means of protecting international interests.10 There was, during this 
period, a hostility by developing countries and the Soviet bloc, towards foreign investment which 
caused developed states to seek legal protections for foreign investments through international 
investment agreements. These agreements, however, were solely focused on protecting foreign 
investment against political risk and not focused on the concepts of liberalization.11  In the 
modern global era, and since the fall of the Soviet bloc, there is a general acceptance in the 
developing world of the value of foreign investment and the practice has become universal. This 
so-called “international investment regime” seeks to “integrate national economies through the 
removal of barriers to investment flows and the protection of established investment”.12 
 
8 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements,” The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment, February 2009, pp. 3-35, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388534.003.0001) 
9 Ibid, 158. 
10 Ibid, 193. 
11 Ibid. 




  The development from force as a means of investment assurance and protection to what 
today is largely an economic and political practice is not inconsequential. One needs to only look 
at the United States policy at the turn of the 20th Century to see this change taking shape. 
Huntington Wilson, the former US Assistant Secretary of State under President Taft, aptly 
described what he termed “Dollar Diplomacy”, that is to say, the heeding away from the threat or 
use of military force as a tool of diplomatic and political influence, but instead the utilization of 
economic power,  in Wilsons' primary example, loans. 13 Under this foreign investment scheme, 
Wilson describes two objectives behind “Dollar Diplomacy”  foreign investment as one, having 
political advantage, that is to say, the primary purpose of strengthening American influence “in 
spheres where it ought to predominate over any other foreign influence on account of reasons of 
fundamental policy…..”14; and two, the economic advantage conferred to investments and 
enterprises that provide both “vital” political interests and permanent and valuable markets for 
trade while at the same time a line into safeguarding trade as well as give standing to emerging 
markets.15 As the United States was a rising global power it cannot be understated that this shift 
away from a military/force approach, even in its infancy, was both critical for its development as 
well as for other nations that would follow this example. What about the role of development aid, 
in addition to foreign investment? 
  The shift away from overt military force and the threat of military force to secondary and 
tertiary means of exerting political will was also chronicled by Nye. He bifurcated power into 
two separate but distinct categories: hard power and soft power. The former is as it sounds, the 
use of force, and the threat of the use of force, primarily through military action as well as the 
 
13 Huntington Wilson, “The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 68 (November 1916): pp. 312-320 





ability to employ economic means to influence outcomes.16 Nye referred to these inducements as 
“sticks” and “carrots”, respectively. The latter, soft power, is what Nye refers to as the “second 
face of power” as it sometimes enables one actor to achieve a desirable outcome without 
“tangible threats or payoffs”. In this respect an important difference between the two is noted: 
hard power coerces and soft power co-opts.17 Namely, as Nye states “ Co-optive power-the 
ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the 
ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express 
some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic”.18 While hard power can utilize 
economic means intended to coerce, actions such as sanctions and embargoes or payments, soft 
power has economic tools as a subcategory intended to co-opt. Nye states commerce can be 
transmitted via culture, this of course, for example, is present in American popular culture, which 
promotes its hybrid of cultural and commerce globally.19 Therefore, for or the purposes of this 
paper an important distinction must be made to ensure that there is a known difference become 
economic hard power and international economics. The former being the aforementioned 
coercive tool per Nye, and the latter being employed for a nation's financial self-interest. 
However, the latter does carry with it influence, though co-optive measures which are very much 
in-line with the “second face of power”. 
  Nye does have his detractors, academics such Colin Grey of the Strategic Studies 
Institute at the US Army War College, who points out soft power does suffer from what is 
perceived to be key weaknesses, chiefly that as an “instrument of policy it…utterly depends on 
 
16 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Ibid, 7. 




the uncoerced choices of foreigners”.20 Additionally, Grey claims soft power offers, in the 
American context, “the agreeable proposition that American values and culture generally have 
some ability to co-opt “others” in an attractively economical way, historical evidence seems to 
point in a different direction. More accurately, the relationship is one wherein soft power flows 
to the owner of hard power. Thucydides in ca. 400 BC is to be recommended as a more reliable 
guide to international relations and foreign policy in the 21st century……”. 21 In so much as Nye 
explains the theoretical and practical disposition of hard and soft power, Grey does have a salient 
point in that soft power is more accessible to and flows more efficiently from an owner of hard 
power. In this regard there is more than just an American model to this dynamic and subsequent 
analysis of other regional powers will prove beneficial. In this regard, contemporary scholarship 
indeed points to both Nye’s and Grey’s observations. Nita Starova claims in the International 
Scientific Journal, that “In this new world, it becomes clear to states that with the help of 
militaristic and economic power, the traditional so-called “hard power”, they can no longer 
achieve their goals. What appears to be more effective in the new complex world is the ability to 
co-operate and network, i.e., the ability to attract and persuade rather than compel.”22 Starova 
cites Germany in particular as a salient example of a state currently employing this dynamic. 
Specifically, she examines the relationship between Germany and North Macedonia. Germany 
has invested large sums of capital in the country and the region surrounding it to “secure the 
neighborhood”, this is, of course, a measure of pragmatism as securing regional stability secures, 
to a large extent, German national security. However, as Starova points out, Germany has also 
done so in an attempt to spread its own political and economic interests, which points inward to 
 
20 Collin S. Gray, “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century,” 
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January 2011, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada542526) 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nina Starova, “Soft Power As a Strong Diplomacy Tool - Learning From German Experience.,” International Scientific 




German stability, of which helps promote an economically and politically stable Europe. Citing 
the quid pro quo nature of this soft power arrangement, she also points out that North Macedonia 
benefits from this co-operation both financially as well as in the domestic arena concerned with 
policies “aimed at improving the living standard in the country”, itself no doubt influenced by 
the German social market economy.23 
 Foreign Investment Instruments  
 Foreign investment manifests itself through a variety of instruments, salient among them 
are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and Foreign Direct 
Investment Infrastructure (FDII).  
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 Ungureanua and Floritina, in their paper Considerations Concerning Foreign Direct 
Investments On Countries of  Origin, Period 2011-2017 define Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
in principle as the “granting of an individual the right to invest in a territory other than the one 
where he is a resident”.24 They observe that in practice a foreign direct investment enterprise is: 
 “...a resident enterprise, with or without legal personality, in which a non-resident 
 investor owns  at least 10 percent of the voting rights or the subscribed share capital, or of 
 the capital endowment/working capital of enterprises without legal personality 
 (branches). The holding of at  least 10 percent of the votes or the subscribed share capital, 
 respectively of the capital endowment/working capital, is essential in establishing the 
 direct investment relationship”.25  
 
FDI brings with it benefits for the investor countries to include tax incentives, reduced 
import/export duties, from countries like the US and EU, access to capital investment, and 
development of investment sites and infrastructure. For the host country benefits conferred are 
 
23 Starova, Soft Power As a Strong Diplomacy Tool, 57 
24 Ungureanu, Emilia, and Cristina Baldan Florentina. “Considerations Concerning Foreign Direct Investments On Countries of  
Origin, Period 2011-2017.” Agricultural Management 21, no. 2 (2019): 82–86. 




potential economic growth, stimulation of domestic investments, financial resources that bring 
long term stability, the gaining of technical and managerial expertise, modern technologies, and a 
line on improved exports in the goods and services market via aid.26 In addition to FDI, another 
soft power financial tool countries utilize are what are called Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).  
 Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
 In Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Acquisition of Power, Ashley Thomas Lenihan 
argues that SWFs have become increasingly “powerful actors in the international system and 
world economy”.27 SWFs are both broadly and narrowly defined foreign investment vehicles, 
and there is debate as to the scope and nature of these vehicles. For the sake of this research 
project an SWF will use Linehan’s modified definition as a fund “government-owned and/or 
controlled investment funds that seek diversified asset portfolios at home and abroad, and which 
have the potential for a long-term investment outlook”.28 Lenihan describes in great detail both 
the financial and economic rationale behind the utilization of SWFs, however, her strongest 
articulations are regarding the fact that it has been argued that SWFs do not pose as much of a 
political threat as some have alluded to. She claims SWFs have proven to carry long-term risk 
effectively thereby playing an important stabilizing role in the global community. Despite this 
claim there is still the possibility of real dangers regarding SWF activities and intents.29 Among 
these dangers is that while an SWF may not invest on the “basis of political motivations today, 
that does not mean it will not (or cannot) do so tomorrow.”30 She feels this will be executed via 
two methods: financial statecraft, that is, for example, SWFs utilizing predatory investments by 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ashley Thomas Lenihan, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Acquisition of Power,” New Political Economy 19, no. 2 (2014): 
pp. 227-257, https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2013.779650) 
28 Ibid.,231. 





one state in another to include “the acquisition of a strategic company (in whole or part) to 
potentially degrade the investment, siphon resources, pilfer sensitive technology or to gain access 
to strategic networks or assets (whether in the form of vital physical, or technological, 
infrastructure)”; as well as balancing, both in internal and external, the former via “moves to 
strengthen and enlarge one’s alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one” and the latter via 
“ moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, [and/or] to develop clever 
strategies”.31 Lenihan concludes that it is likely that if political motivations are behind SWFs 
they are likely in the realm of internal balancing, noting that this strategy will weaken existing 
alliances in a non-coercive manner as well as make a recipient state more dependent on the 
investor-state.32 Similarly, Shannon A. Murphy concludes in her paper Leviathans Double 
Bottom Line: Sovereign Wealth Funds As Tools of Strategic Statecraft: 
 “sovereign wealth funds' embodiment of a double bottom line, that represents the 
 sponsor's ability to earn excess financial return while accruing political or strategic 
 benefits, may define the next  era in global finance and foreign policy. Power theory 
 indicates that subtle manifestations of economic power may sometimes be more 
 successful and long-lasting than their “hard” power  counterparts”.33 
 Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure (FDII) 
 Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure (FDII), according to Jiang et. al in their paper 
Foreign Infrastructure Investment In Developing Countries: A Dynamic Panel Data Model Of 
Political Risk Impacts, while being similar to that of FDI, is characterized by high 




33 Shannon A Murphy, “Leviathan's Double Bottom Line: Sovereign Wealth Funds as Tools of Strategic Statecraft by Shannon 
A. Murphy.,” Leviathan's double bottom line: Sovereign wealth funds as tools of strategic statecraft by Shannon A. Murphy. 




consumers, namely the government.”34 FDII is influenced heavily by political risk and, in an 
optimal scenario, requires a stable political environment, making developed counties the ideal 
targets for FDII.35 However FDII is a paradoxical tool in that undeveloped countries, with a lack 
of political leverage and/or economic options, are likely to be overtly influenced by an investor 
nation, and thus are themselves significant targets. Like FDI, FDII itself carries political risk for 
the recipient country as well,  Feng Sun in his paper The Duel Political Effects of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Developing Countries notes that besides the associated risks of state ownership in 
FDI vehicles, FDII vehicles carry with then not only “economic motives” but are possibly 
undertaken for strategic reasons, namely “acquisitions related to energy, infrastructure services, 
extractive resources, or other industries with a “security dimension”. In the case of the 
developing world, Feng notes critically that “Resource-seeking FDI is often associated with 
authoritarian regimes. A growing literature on the political resource curse argues that 
authoritarian regimes take advantage of the large revenues from taxes, licenses, and profit-
sharing arrangements generated by foreign companies through the exploitation of natural 
resources to buttress their elite political positions.”36 Accordingly, Feng concludes that while 
FDI and FDII enhance economic development observing that “the proposition that economic 
development promotes democracy not only applies well in the developed countries but also fits 
well in the developing world”;37 he also observes that “When only considering the result of the 
political effects of overall FDI, it casts doubt on the liberal consensus that integration into the 
 
34 Weiling Jiang et al., “Foreign Infrastructure Investment In Developing Countries: A Dynamic Panel Data Model Of Political 
Risk Impacts,” Technological and Economic Development of Economy 25, no. 2 (July 2019): pp. 134-167, 
https://doi.org/10.3846/tede.2019.7632) 
35 Ibid, 135. 
36 Feng Sun, “The Dual Political Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries,” The Journal of Developing 
Areas 48, no. 1 (2014): pp. 107-125, https://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2014.0020) 




global economy has a direct positive effect on the domestic democratization.”38 While these 
works focus largely on the political implications of FDII on recipient countries in the developing 
world, conclusions can be drawn from both Jiang et. al and Feng, and that is namely that 
investing in infrastructure carries political risks for the recipient country in both the developing 
and developed world. In both scenarios, infrastructure is critical to a strong economy and, of 
course, political stability. While in the developing world political stability is oftentimes 
capricious, in the developed world it is more of a constant than a variable. Feng notes this, 
observing that “not all forms of foreign investment seem to be beneficial to political 
development in the developing world”39, it is therefore a safe assumption to make that a 
developing country may be susceptible to authoritarian influence when taking FDII from an 
authoritarian regime. What has not been examined more thoroughly is the scenario in which an 
authoritarian regime is deploying FDII to a developed advanced democratic country. 
  Herein lies a large gap in the present body of research, while it is easier to assume that a 
developing recipient country would be more susceptible to influence from an investor country, 
especially an authoritarian one, what would be the investor countries' influence on an advanced 
developed democratic country? Nye’s power theory may aid in an examination of this dynamic, 
in concert with Grey’s observation that the co-optive nature of soft power is a relationship 
“wherein soft power flows to the owner of hard power”. 40 How does this co-optive dynamic 
influence a developed country, especially one of an advanced democratic system? While this 
observation would be nuanced it may prove illuminating to further examine how a recipient 
advanced democracy is indeed influenced. A metric through which to view this possible 
 
38 Ibid, 122. 
39 Ibid, 121 




influence is recipient nations' views and addressing of the investor nations' human rights track 
record. Human Rights are summarized per the articles of United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) as a set of principles that codifies the inherent rights that all human 
beings have irrespective of race, religion, sex, or nationality to include the foundational rights to 
“life, liberty, and the security of the person.”41 This segues into an additional gap in the body of 
current research, while much has been researched by way of investor countries investing capital 
into recipient countries with poor human rights records the corollary is deficient at best. 
However, there have been attempts to codify an agreed-upon strategy between investor and 
recipient (i.e. “host”) countries. In Bruno Simma’s paper Foreign Investment Arbitration: A 
Place for Human Rights? he argues that human rights should coincide with investment 
protections to be of equal standing. Simma observes “What is desirable, indeed necessary, 
therefore is that host states and foreign investors must mutually consider other strategies 
available within the framework of the international investment regime to harmonize investment 
protection with human rights compliance. These objectives need not be incompatible”.42  
 As the literature explains, besides the practical financial benefits of foreign investment, 
there is also the practical political elements that traditionally manifest themselves between 
nations; Nye’s power theory aptly explains this. When delving into this theory it becomes 
apparent that the co-opting ability of soft power is very much a central tenet of FDI, SWFs, and 
FDII. Along these lines, the internal balancing strategy, per Murphy, can weaken existing 
alliances in a non-coercive manner as well as making a recipient state more dependent on the 
investor-state. Based on these observations it would appear that foreign investment, in the 
 
41“ Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (United Nations, December 10, 1948), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf) 
42 Bruno Simma, “Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place For Human Rights?,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 




manners aforementioned, are very much soft power political tools, ones in which influence is not 
as robustly overt as the tools of hard power, but in line with Nye’s “second face of power”, 
insidious and subtle. If these influences are subtle, as there are developed nations, advanced 
democracies, who are themselves recipient nations of investor countries with questionable 
human rights records, and this dynamic is the salient gap in the present body of research, then it 
will be necessary to examine such a dynamic. This examination will investigate the validity of 
the hypothesis that developed countries, specifically liberal democracies, who receive foreign 
investment from known human rights violators, tend to tone down their rhetoric towards the 
violating investor country. This will be accomplished via a case study examination of the PRC, 
the authoritarian investor nation, and Germany and Greece, both developed countries and 
advanced liberal democracies who are large recipients of PRC investment. 
Hypothesis and Methods  
 Hypothesis  
  
 Null Hypothesis: 
  
 Liberal Democracies, who receive foreign investment from known human rights 
 violators, do not tone down their rhetoric towards the violating investor country. Foreign 
 investments do not have influence.  
  
 Alternative Hypothesis: 
 
 Liberal Democracies, who receive foreign investment from known human rights 
 violators, do tone down their rhetoric towards the violating investor country. Foreign 
 investments do have influence. 
 
 
 This research project is proposing the notion that recipient countries are changing their 
rhetoric towards investor countries who have known human rights violations as a result of a 




variables, determining whether or not this hypothesis affirms that foreign investment does have 
influence will be the observation of recipient/investor country relationships. While the dynamic 
of countries with poor human rights records (likely authoritarian regimes) investing in 
developing countries plays out across the world, sub-Sahara Africa being a prime example, as 
discussed, a dynamic that has not been thoroughly studied has been an authoritarian regime 
investing in a developed country with an advanced liberal democracy. If indeed these developed 
advanced liberal democratic countries, which have significant foreign investment from a country 
with known human rights violations, change their language towards the investing countries' 
human rights issues as a result of these investments, the alternative hypothesis will be accepted. 
 
 Definition and operationalization of variables  
 
This research project constituent dependent variable (DV) and independent variables 
(IV) are as follows:  
 
DV: Attitudinal changes measured by language of Liberal Democracies           
         receiving foreign investment from a known human rights violator country  
 





The optimal end state is the evidence being sufficient enough in substance to support this 
paper's working hypothesis, that is to say if it can affirm the alternative hypothesis. With this as 
the central objective, this paper will utilize a traditional essay format towards examining this 
hypothesis. Data sought for these case studies will consist of qualitative and quantitative 
economic data, from both primary and secondary sources, peer reviewed content relating to the 
impacts of FDI, SWFs, and FDII, think tank and policy papers, graduate and post graduate 




statements, and other inter-governmental communiques, from Germany and Greece, regarding 
foreign investment, humans rights policy actions towards violator partner countries, and 
optimally, documents discussing the nexus between the two. 
Data  
 
 As this research project has elaborated, examining the effects of foreign investment in the 
forms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and Foreign Direct 
Investment in Infrastructure (FDII) on a recipient countries attitude and policy towards an 
investor country's human rights violations is a broad endeavor indeed. As discussed, there is 
evidence of the negative influence on recipient developing countries in regard to liberal 
approaches to governance (and thereby a corresponding negative approach and practice of 
human rights) from an authoritarian investor country. In this case the recipient country would 
likely not be difficult to observe. The research supports as much as that very dynamic has been 
examined. However, what has not been examined thoroughly are the effects that foreign 
investments, from human rights violators, have on liberal democracies in developed countries. 
While developing countries have little leverage, and actively seek out and are agreeable to 
foreign investment, theirs is a problem of options and weaknesses. These countries typically lack 
the appropriate options to otherwise build infrastructure or access resources and cannot do it 
themselves which gives an investor country significant leverage. 
  This research projects approach is to examine the dynamic of attitudinal changes of 
liberal democracies who receive foreign investment, in the forms of FDI, SWFs, and FDII from a 
known human rights violator country. To maintain relevance and ensure this observation is both 
topical and current the following countries will fill the roles of investor and recipient (host 




countries, and the investor country examined will be the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A 
liberal democracy, for this paper, will be defined as:  
 “The extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule; 
 Political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to 
 express a variety of  political opinions and in any media and the freedom to form or 
 participate in any political group. Democratic rule (or political rights) exists to the 
 extent they the national government is accountable to the general population, and each 
 individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through representatives”43 
 
Human rights violators will be defined simply as a country with a track record of violating the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). For this research paper PRC 
FDI, SWFS, and FDII, via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will be individually examined with 
analogous qualitative information. Germany will be examined via the first two and Greece will 
be examined via the last, specifically BRI investments. Additionally, the paper will conduct an 
examination of PRC human rights violations as well as an exploration of possible influence and 
soft power dynamics, if such dynamics exist.  
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, as stated,  is the “granting of an individual the right to 
invest in a territory other than the one where he is a resident…a resident enterprise, with or 
without legal personality, in which a non-resident investor owns at least 10 percent of the voting 
rights or the subscribed share capital, or of the capital endowment/working capital of enterprises 
without legal personality (branches).” Europe has become quite attractive to the PRC for various 
reasons to include “technology, know-how, established and reputable brands, as well as a 
gigantic consumer market”; additionally around the time of the global financial downturn, and 
the corresponding downturn on the continent, Europe represented an opportunity for investment 
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“bargains”. Coupled with the perception that the continent is freer of the  political opposition of 
the electoral politics of the United States, where the PRC has been “scapegoated”, Europe 
became a key FDI destination.44 Accordingly, around this time Chinese FDI tripled in Europe 
between 2006 and 2009, and tripled again in 2011; by some estimation, Europe represented 48% 
of all Chinese outward FDI during this period.45 Additionally in 2012 the number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) conducted by Chinese companies in Europe surpassed the opposite dynamic 
for the first time.46 Of the individual European Union (EU) member countries, three “core” 
economies constituted the bulk of PRC investment inflows between 2008 and 2016, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and France, with Germany and the United Kingdom accounting for more 
than half of the total of incoming Chinese investment in 2016.47 Germany produces a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately 3.4 trillion Euros, which represents the largest 
economy in the EU and has maintained this status since 1980 (this before east-west 
reunification). 48 As such Germany represents a major target for Chinese FDI. 
  While the German economy is the largest attraction for Chinese FDI, it isn’t the only 
attractive feature. While in the logic of PRC calculus, Germany has been evaluated for additional 
factors to include social stability, political security, and bilateral relations with the PRC, there is 
one factor that trumps all: the “favorable position” of German companies in regard to Chinese 
digitalization efforts. The PRC has made it a cornerstone goal to make their manufacturing 
“competitive in high technology sectors concerning the industrialized countries.”49 PRC mergers 
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in Germany have focused primarily on four sectors: high-speed rail transport, electricity 
generation, automotive, and machine building, all of which fall in line with PRC digitalization 
efforts and the corollary German effort deemed “Industry 4.0.”50 A recent acquisition and 
excellent example of this strategy was the majority purchase of the German robotics company 
KUKA AG. The Chinese company Midea, makers of household appliances, is “one of China’s 
three largest home appliance makers and active in market segments including air conditioners, 
household appliances, motors for industrial use and logistics for e-commerce. KUKA AG is one 
of the world’s leading automation companies.”51 As Midea has taken a 94% share of the 
company, they have agreed to retain both the location of the company and jobs until 2023.52 
While only one example, PRC FDI in Germany gives the Chinese unparalleled access to the 
EU’s central economy, one which is efficient, technologically advanced, and well managed. The 
PRC gains the technology and efficiencies they seek as well as holding the position of both 
major employer and job creator. While very good business for the PRC and Germany, FDI in 
Germany likely affords the PRC significant influence. Germany has been the beneficiary of the 
second most (outward) Foreign Direct Investment from China in Europe, with net investments 
from 2000 to 2014 totaling  EU€ 6.9 Billion; since 2011 “annual investment levels have “jumped 
up and stated stable at stable at €1-2 billion per year, which differs from the volatile patterns 
found in other economies.”53 Quantifying this in terms of importance to the Germany economy, 
both from financial and employment metrics, as of 2014 all 16 German states were hosting 
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Chinese companies. The majority of these investments are targeted towards the old states of the 
former West Germany as these states account for “ nearly 90% of GDP and nearly 90% of 
manufacturing turnover”.54 Simply put, PRC FDI is targeting the bulk of German GDP and 
within that its most prodigious sector, manufacturing. Theo Hanemann and Miko Huotari 
observe in their paper, Chinese FDI in Europe and Germany Preparing for a New Era of 
Chinese Capital, the European logic for attracting Chinese FDI and in the process capture the 
German motivations behind such a strategy: 
 “Foreign sources of productive direct investment that create and maintain jobs are 
 therefore a pressing demand across Europe. Compared to other more volatile and pro-
 cyclical capital flows, FDI will contribute to economic 
 stability and development. Due to the sheer number of investors, private and 
 state-owned, with their variegated interests, Chinese investment has the capacity to 
 provide important simultaneous stimuli for economic development across different 
 sectors in Europe.”55 
 
Thus with such a significant portion of Chinese FDI directed at the majority of the German GDP, 
and the logic of economic stability and development that it will bring, Germany will likely want 
to maintain a tone with Beijing that maintains the current FDI arrangements and keeps the door 
open to future opportunities.  
 Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
 
 Similarly, like FDI, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), have similar leverage and 
influence in Germany. SWFs, as stated are “government-owned and/or controlled investment 
funds that seek diversified asset portfolios at home and abroad, and which have the potential for 
a long-term investment outlook” 56. Of Chinese SWFs, the largest is the Chinese Investment 
Corp. (CIC), established in 2008 to “manage and diversify Chinese foreign exchange reserves 
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beyond its’ traditional investments in dollar-denominated bonds.”57 The CIC is the PRC’s 
flagship fund and is directly subordinate to the State Council and is supervised by representatives 
for the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and the Ministry of Finance.58  The PRC started CIC 
with US$200 billion of its foreign exchange reserves and by the end of 2011 it has amassed 
US$482 billion in assets. 59 Initial annual reports showed CIC investing across a diverse 
spectrum to include “corporate bonds, infrastructure projects, mining ventures in assorted areas 
such as Africa and Canada, “blue chip” stocks and private-equity partnerships.”60 While 
Germany has been wary of the intent and scope of SWFs like the CIC, with German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel's cabinet recently vetoing, for the first time,  a Chinese takeover of a German 
firm, “Yantai Taihai Group withdrew its offer for toolmaker Leifeld Metal Spinning at the last 
minute, after the German government signaled it would block the acquisition because of 
“security reasons.”61 This, however, has not stopped the PRC nor the CIC from pursuing 
investment in Germany.   
  A recent notable acquisition made through the CIC is the German highway rest-stop gas 
station company Tank and Rast that has a potential value of around “€3 billion, or $3.35 billion, 
which would be by far the largest Chinese acquisition in Germany.” This purchase is said to give 
the PRC a significant “foothold” in Germany. 62 Germany does seem to be taking a harder stance 
on SWFs, protecting its IT security, software, and computer security sectors, considered sensitive 
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and placing the ability to block any non-European firm “planning to buy more than a 10 percent 
stake in sensitive sectors.”63  While the stated goal of the CIC is akin to that any other financial 
entity, that is to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns for its’ shareholders, there has been a 
noticeable difference with this SWF versus Chinese FDI vehicles64; former CIC president Gao 
Xiqing bluntly stated that “Chinese overseas investments aim to make profits but at the same 
time build influence.”65 The maleficent potential of SWFs  did not go unnoticed, then former US 
President Barak Obama, when discussing his views on SWFs stated “‘ I am obviously concerned 
if these… Sovereign Wealth Funds are motivated by more than just market considerations and 
that’s obviously a possibility.”66 SWFs offer China an excellent opportunity to access capital and 
manufacturing markets in Europe and the EU and based market size alone Germany is quite a 
prize. While, as of late, Germany has become cautious with regards to investments in the 
“sensitive” sectors, the fact remains that the appeal of Chinese capital infusion into German 
business, in the form of SWFs, may prove to be too alluring to offset most security concerns. 
 Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure (FDII) 
 Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure (FDII) is similar to that of FDI but “is 
characterized by high monopolization, large investment amounts, long payback periods, along 
with a special class of consumers, namely the government.”67 Further FDII is as it sounds, with 
its primary target being that of infrastructure. While FDII invests in infrastructure in various 
forms, and Chinese FDII certainly spans the EU, there is perhaps one investment that stands 
above the rest and indeed shows both the reach, potential, and intent of Chinese FDII. The Belt 
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and Road Initiative, referred to as the “BRI”, is a massive undertaking by the PRC. Under 
President for Life Xi Jinping, the PRC has embarked on an ambitious two-prong strategy: 
creating an overland “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road Initiative”. 68 The 
Silk Road harkens to the networks created during the Han Dynasty which created trade 
throughout Central Asia.69 The current iteration of the BRI will connect 65 countries and consist 
of energy pipelines, railway networks, and efficient border crossings, via the former Soviet 
Republics and south through Pakistan, India, and Southeast Asia. 70The PRC is investing heavily 
in port development in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. Participant initiative 
countries currently account for 30% of global nominal GDP, 44% of the world’s population, and 
40% of global GDP growth.71 The economic potential of the BRI for the PRC is, in short, 
staggering. As indicated the BRI is a broad and wide-reaching undertaking, and it could be 
qualitatively studied far beyond the current body of research. 
  FDII Significance in Greece  
  In so much as Germany is the beating heart of the EU’s economy, Greece, and its 
Mediterranean peninsula, represent the key and critical access point to the Union, accordingly 
the PRC has made Greece a key focus of the Belt and Road’s maritime silk road. Of the ports 
eyed by the Chinese, none carry more attention than Piraeus Port. China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO), the state-owned shipping company, purchased rights for two of the port’s 
container terminals in 2008 72; in 2016 COSCO, for EU€ 368.5 million (USD 20.2 million), 
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purchased a 67% stake in Piraeus Port Authority. In doing so COSCO is now the port's primary 
operator.73 COSCO now owns a controlling share of the port business; they will review the 
remaining shares in 2021 when completing investments for facilities, annual fees, and future 
investments and interest. 74 The port is currently ranked 36th in the world, up from 93rd when 
the deal was completed; capacity has seen an increase of .68 million Twenty-foot Equivalent 
Units (TEU’s) in 2007 to 4.15 by 2017.75 Piraeus is likely intended to link the maritime road 
with the overland belt via a proposed Chinese -EU high-speed rail line that would connect the 
port to Central Europe, from Belgrade to Budapest, all the while upgrading commercial routes in 
the region.76 Piraeus benefits Greece in many facets from employment, to trade, to connectivity. 
From this perspective Chinese FDII seems an indispensable asset if Greece is to maintain a place 
as a destination for trade. This allure indeed offers the PRC, much like their investments in 
Germany, a position of influence, both of which will be discussed in detail later in this paper.  As 
influence is a likely product of all three investment vehicles, this has not gone unnoticed by 
some; when discussing the maritime silk road, the European Council on Foreign Relations 
(ECFR) had this to say about it: 
 
 “Besides the blue economy and naval power, the Maritime Silk Road is also about 
 addressing what Chinese intellectuals have described for many years as a deficit of 
 “power of discourse” … the ability of states to impose their concepts, ideas, 
 and narratives and to shape international discussions. By playing on the mythical 
 appeal of the ancient route that first emerged during the Song dynasty, China seeks 
 to promote an attractive narrative in international politics. The Maritime Silk Road 
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The question remains however in how this influence manifests itself. 
 
 PRC Human Right Violations 
 
 If one has paid attention to current events or has a passing interest in international human 
rights, they would know that China is routinely rounding out the top of the list of human rights 
violators. The Hong Kong protests notwithstanding, the PRC has deployed a mass surveillance 
system in an attempt to cast a wide net and tighten control over society.78 In 2018 the Chinese 
government continued to collect and develop, on a mass scale, biometrics including DNA and 
voice samples used for automated surveillance purposes, a nationwide reward and punishment 
system known as the "social credit system", and applied “big data” policing programs “aimed at 
preventing dissent”.79 All of these systems are being deployed “without effective privacy 
protections in law or in practice, and often people are unaware that their data is being gathered, 
or how it is used or stored”.80 
 There is perhaps no group in China however, that has suffered more under these 
authoritarian practices as of late than the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, who are viewed as an 
extremist separatist movement and a threat to the communist government.81 It is estimated that 
"some 800,000 to 2,000,000 Uighur's and other Muslims, including Kazakhs and Uzbeks, have 
been detained since April of 2017." 82 While there is limited information about what exactly 
occurs in the camps, according to the Council on Foreign Relations:  
 “Detainees are forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP and renounce Islam... others said 
 they were tortured....women  have shared stories of sexual abuse...some released 
 detainees contemplated suicide or witnessed others kill themselves.”83 
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While the PRC has yet to allow a thorough inspection of the detention camps, nor for that matter 
adequately address the Uighur situation, the reality remains they are likely in violation of several 
sections of the UDHR. 
 German and Greek Responses: Economic Influence and Soft Power Dynamics  
 Chinese foreign investment in the forms of FDI, SWFs and FDII have become important 
functions in the world economy. As examined the EU is increasingly a target for Chinese 
investment. While there is great financial promise for all parties involved, the PRC undoubtedly 
holds more a dominant position as recipient economies are using Chinese investment in many 
regards as a “tentpole” of sorts to create jobs and bolster their economies. Greece is an excellent 
example of the allure of PRC investment, as Plamen Tonchev and Polyxeni Davarinou observe in 
their paper Chinese Investment in Greece and the Big Picture of Sino-Greek Relations, that with 
regards to PRC FDII, Piraeus Port is of particular significance to the Greeks. The authors cite the 
Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (FEIR/IOBE) who carried out a study 
examining the COSCO buyout of the Piraeus Port Authority (PPA). In terms of fiscal revenue 
FEIR claimed that: 
 “the cumulative benefit over the period from 2016 to 2025 is 
 estimated to stand at €511 million or €475 million in present value terms. The 
 privatization of the port and its operation under the conditions of higher efficiency is 
 expected to have a positive impact on the port turnover as well. Overall, IOBE 
 calculates that the public revenue from the two agreements with COSCO, the 
 concession in 2008 and the purchase of stock in 2016, will yield up to €893.5 million 




 sources: stock sale, concession fees, dividends, taxation and social benefits (insurance 
 80 payments)”84 
In addition to Piraeus Port other PRC development investment initiatives such as Greek group 
Lamda Development, majority backed by a Chinese real estate company, Fosun International Ltd., 
which won an EU€7 billion project to develop Athens’ former airport at Hellenikon. 85 Lamda 
Development estimates that the investment will help “create 10,000 permanent jobs during the 
construction period and 75,000 jobs during its maturity......expected to generate a 2.4% worth of 
the country’s GDP by completion date, while contributing a total of over €14 billion in taxes to 
the Greek state within a 25-year timeframe.”86 These examples are but two of the FDII moves by 
the PRC in Greece, both promise significant ROI for China and for Greece the possibility of  job 
sector growth and economic expansion. 
 Greece began a divergent rhetorical path around 2016 when they blocked a statement 
intended for the European Council “following the International Arbitration Court ruling on the 
South China Sea. Thus, instead of the strong statement of support submitted to the European 
Council by the European External Action Service, acknowledging a ruling unfavorable to 
Beijing, the EU issued a very general statement on the arbitration outcome, delivering a symbolic 
victory for China. This victory was the result of Greece’s influence, along with that of Hungary 
and Croatia.”87  In 2017 they blocked another EU statement by the EU, this time at the United 
Nations which entailed criticizing China’s human rights record;  Greece called the initial 
statement “unconstructive criticism of China”, elaborating that “Greece’s position is that 
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unproductive and in many cases, selective criticism against specific countries does not facilitate 
the promotion of human rights in these states, nor the development of their relationship with the 
EU.”88  It can be implied, and rather strongly at that, that Greece did not want to upset Beijing 
and lobbied hard for the EU to tone down their statement. This is good. More such analysis was 
needed in this paper.  
 As result of the 2008 global financial crisis which magnified the Eurozone crisis, Greece 
had its credit rating severely downgraded which plunged the country into “deep recession, 
accompanied by high levels of unemployment and a large deficit as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP).”89 As a result of this Greece was forced to take bailouts from the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to avoid insolvency and subsequently instituted harsh austerity measures, and were subject to 
“strong external interference” in their economic policy. From these stern and desperate measures 
arose an emboldened Euroscepticism in both politics and the population; so much so that “a 
coalition government was formed on the basis of its common Eurosceptic and anti-system 
agenda, and the mainstream pro-EU parties were faced with substantive electoral losses.”90For 
impartialities sake it could be argued that Greece, in the face of such struggle and national 
embarrassment, had an axe to grind. However, despite their criticisms of the EU, demonstrating 
such an excoriation of its EU partners, on the international stage no less, and regarding agreed 
upon human rights standards, was and is unprecedented.  This is nevertheless consistent with 
their logic, the inflows of Chinese investment are huge, Piraeus port alone is critical to the Greek 
economy. Greek deputy prime minister Yannis Dragasakis recently warned that EU suspicion of 
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China is “ in danger of becoming a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ while reaffirming his country's 
support for Beijing’s controversial “Belt and Road Initiative”.91 Dragasakis went on to say that 
Greece “badly needs investment” and that he hopes “logic prevails at the end of the day, which 
means we should take advantage of all opportunities and build on these prospects to further our 
collaboration.”92  
 Examining the tenure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a telling sign in the 
underlying influence of the Sino-German relationship. Felix Heiduk’s study, Conflicting Images? 
Germany and the Rise of China is a telling look into the German approach. His findings suggest 
that “the dominant image of China is that of a key trade partner on whom Germany’s economy is 
increasingly dependent with little emphasis given to the political or normative discrepancies 
between the two countries.”93 Bear in mind Merkel “promised” a normative turn in foreign 
policy towards China going so far as meeting with the Dali Lama, drawing strong diplomatic 
protest from Beijing.94 However, her policy preferences found in her communications have been 
interpreted as suggesting “little space for the promotion of democracy or human rights, and 
heavily focus on economic cooperation and constructive engagement with China.”95 Heiduk 
applies his observations of Merkel's intentions via a methodology examining her 
communications for a period of six years, 2008 to 2012, in which: 
 "Merkel referred to China in close to 300 public communications. This [Heiduk's] article 
 draws on a selection made at key events before, during and after China visits by 
 Merkel, visits to Germany by high-ranking Chinese officials, and a number of high 
 profile national and international events. Altogether 57 public communications were 
 used for this study."96 
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From these public communications Heiduk observes that China's economic capabilities "are of 
primary concern to Merkel as she envisions China first and foremost as an economic 
powerhouse."97 Notably Heiduk observes not only Germany's economic dependence on China 
but Europe's, citing Merkel who stated: 
  ‘China has managed to surmount the international financial and economic crisis in an 
 impressive manner and has thereby made a contribution to the abilities of others, 
 especially Germany as an export-oriented nation but other nations as well, to 
 overcome the crisis, too’.41 Or, in the words of one interviewee: ‘It is obvious to  
 everybody that if China is doing badly, the world economy will do badly’.98 
 
Most alarming while Merkel does speak of human rights as an important issue it appears that her 
policy preferences are in fact “devoid of any references to policy actions such as policies to 
contain China, to increase pressure on China or to isolate China.”99 An example of this can be 
found her press statement regarding her 2012 China trip where mentions the Tibet issue: 
 "We spoke about the situation of human rights as a whole. The topic of Tibet was also 
 brought up, but not quite explicitly, but as one of many topics that also worry us. It has 
 been repeatedly pointed out here that there is a great interest in stable development. For 
 my part, I always say that I believe that the vitality, diversity of a civil society should still 
 be allowed, and that it will ultimately lead to the strengthening of a society and its 
 capabilities.'100 
 
Yet, as she does mention Tibet the statement was without any discernable action oriented  
 
language suggesting a policy correction in light of it and Heiduk aptly sums up that there is a  
 
"strong emphasis on a stable development of China as one of Germany’s main trade partners.101 
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While Heiduk's research spanned until 2012, Merkel's logic is still in line with current events as 
the past year has shown; during the six months of unrest in Hong Kong and throughout the 
Uighur oppression in Xinjiang, Merkel has been careful not to “explicitly support the pro-
democracy, or condemn the internment camps.”102 This fits into the perception of China as “an 
(ever-rising) economic powerhouse and the self-perception of Germany as an export-driven 
trading state, Merkel’s policy preferences toward China are strongly dominated by economic 
concerns.”103 Looking at Merkel's position over time, however, is an exercise in contrast as she 
entered office championing the practice of  Mut zu kritischen To¨nen, her “rhetorical 
commitment to a value-driven foreign policy towards China.”104 How so? Has Germany acted in 
specific ways (in terms of its policy statements on China or within the EC) which indicate that it 
is ignoring Chinese human rights abuses? 
 With Germany, the PRC gains access to the largest and most efficient, reliable economy in 
the European Union and with Greece, they gain a foothold, geographically in the Union, from port 
to rail to road. As the above data indicated these are no insignificant sums, and the investments 
have far-reaching implications, beyond the financial. There is a simple observation that can be 
made with such important economically dependent relationships, while both parties require their 
opposite, this is not symbiotic. The PRC is providing significant investment funding; thus, 
Germany and Greece are in the unenviable position of "policing” their language towards China, in 
effect not pursuing diplomatic or economic recourse. In Germany, PRC FDI is targeted at investing 
in German states which account for “nearly 90% of GDP and nearly 90% of manufacturing 
turnover” 105  and PRC SWFs are funding acquisitions to gain footholds outside of German 
 
102“ Why Is Germany Silent on China's Human Rights Abuses?: DW: 05.12.2019,” DW.COM (Deutsche Welle), accessed 
February 26, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-germany-silent-on-chinas-human-rights-abuses/a-51545962) 
103 Heiduk, Conflicting Images? 129. 
104 Ibid, 129. 




manufacturing and into different sectors.  PRC FDII in Greece is targeted towards Greek ports and 
transportation hubs that promise both jobs and GDP growth. In short, these investments are 
pinpointed at critical revenue generating economic and geographic centers and are thus massively 
important to both countries.  
 As this research project set out to capture data that would affirm the alternate hypothesis it 
did indeed find qualitative and quantitative data that revealed the scale, scope, and breadth of PRC 
foreign investment in Germany and Greece. From this data it can be implied, with certainty, that 
PRC foreign investment, in the forms of FDI, SWFs, and FDII play a not insignificant role for 
China, Germany, and Greece. China clearly benefits via broad access to critical manufacturing and 
consumer markets, all while financing key strategic entry points to allow for further growth, 
Germany and Greece benefit as Chinese investment provides, at least for the moment, a stable 
capital investment source. This benefits GDP output for Germany, and in the case of Greece, 
besides a potential GDP bump, it contributes to both a stabilized economy and employment 
outlook. This data strongly implies that PRC foreign investment is quite important to Germany and 
Greece, and from this it can be inferred that PRC foreign investment, and its importance to both 
countries, carries with it significant influence. This is primarily observed in Germany's notional 
addressing of PRC human rights violations in their public discourse and not following up with any 
type of punitive measure towards the PRC as well as Greece's public statements seemingly 
defending the PRC, or at the very least showing indifference towards, their human rights 
violations. However, the critical data that was not uncovered in this research that was hoped for 
were policy statements and diplomatic and or inter-governmental communiques regarding the 
PRC, PRC foreign investment, human rights violations, and optimally, a nexus between the two. 




processes behind any strategies or courses of action on the part of Germany or Greece. 
Accordingly, these materials, if they exist, are likely marked in some type of classification not 
accessible for public consumption. Without these sources it is not possible to see the definitive 
influence of PRC foreign investment on the governments of Germany or Greece. In other words, 
a causal relationship, while highly likely, cannot be determined. 
Discussion  
 There are a great deal of factors involved with one country influencing another, this 
papers hypothesis, that liberal democracies, who receive foreign investment from known human 
rights violators, tone down their rhetoric towards the violating investor country, is merely a 
more obvious lens from which to examine this. While analyzing geopolitical influence can be 
nuanced, in the case of human rights via the lens of the UDHR, where a country stands on or 
more importantly what it says in regard to human rights is a telling indicator. The PRC is a 
known human rights violator, that is beyond question and in light of the Uighur situation, the 
public language of Germany and Greece is a telling indicator of just how Chinese investment has 
influenced both. While this papers hypothesis has fallen short of proving causation there is every 
reason to suspect that with further policy and position research, and through the natural 
development of Sino-German and Sino-Greek investment activity, a causal relationship will have 
a high probability of being established.  What is needed is more policy data, the aforementioned 
diplomatic and inter-governmental material, a larger sample size of available data, and more 
thorough analysis.  
 The research question asked whether or not influence of foreign investment from known 
human rights violators on liberal democracies with regards to attitudes towards these violations 




on the size and importance of PRC foreign investment in Germany and Greece and based on both 
countries’ language with regards to Chinese human rights violations, which occurred after the 
investment relationships had been established, it can be concluded that these investments 
absolutely influenced the German attitude and Greek criticism.  This was not a coercive move, 
there were no known diplomatic pressures or otherwise on either nation to take these positions, 
yet nevertheless they did; this very much lines up with Nye's belief in the co-optive nature of soft 
power. In other words, a direct benefit from ample PRC foreign investment is the recipient 
country looking past, and as in the case of Greece, appearing to defend an authoritarian regime 
and its human rights violations. There is one particularly serious implication for theories 
discussed previously, mainly that globalization is a force for good. While it has connected 
economies, allowed nations to develop and grow faster, and has connected the world it also 
carries the ability to export anti-democratic views, and in the case of the PRC, authoritarian ones. 
While something like tied aid has strings attached, terms and conditions, FDI, SWFs, and FDII 
don't require these as their importance is implied by their size and importance to recipient 
economies. An important perspective that should be adopted is to view not only what foreign 
investment is for but to as well consider who it is from.  
Conclusion 
 It is no secret that China is doling out massive amounts of foreign investment the world 
over. Of course, every country and investment situation are different, to examine them all would 
be an ambitious, if not difficult venture. Germany and Greece were each selected because they 
represent the opposite sides of EU economic strength, the former with an efficient and 
dependable economic engine and the latter on constant uneven ground; the former representing a 




strategic value. Both, per the definition of this research project, are liberal democracies. While 
there needs to be more data to allow a pattern to emerge, the tenet question simplified of whether 
PRC foreign investment is influencing Germany and Greece was revealing. Both countries take 
on PRC human rights violations are concerning and very public admissions of impartiality. If 
Germany and Greece are willing to allow PRC foreign investment to attain such a status that it 
prevents them from speaking out against Chinese human rights violations what else might this 
portend? 
 Despite their economic attractiveness and potential, Germany and Greece are also likely 
attractive to China for strategic reasons as both are NATO members. While investing in 
Germany and Greece gives China entree to European markets and access to vital sectors and a 
first world consumer class, the fact that both reside within the US sphere of influence is not a 
fact lost on Beijing. As China extends its reach globally, out beyond the littorals of the South 
China Sea where they have, and are, using coercive hard power measures to mitigate territorial 
maritime disputes, it is likely they are employing co-optive soft power measures where hard ones 
would not be appropriate. As the global power structure is changing, with both China and Russia 
exerting their presence in what they consider their “backyards” and beyond, it would make sense 
to employ elements of soft power that do not raise outright suspicion in areas of strategic 
interest. It appears Beijing may indeed be deploying their foreign investments for precisely these 
purposes 
 Germany and Greece have punted, so to speak, on PRC human rights issues, and while 
this is not a definitive interpretation of eithers foreign policy with regards to China it does set an 
uneasy precedent.   As China continues to assert itself will other questionable and aggressive acts 




mum on PRC expansion in the South China Sea and other hegemonic type actions? As China 
increases investment to other EU partner nations, will those nations do likewise? What should be 
a major concern is how this impacts NATO. As the PRC expands its reach in Europe it is only a 
matter of time before NATO becomes an issue. If Germany and Greece are indicators, Chinese 
investment and its increasing influence will likely play a significant factor in how the EU and 
NATO carry out policy, coordination, and the execution of their mission. Degrading NATO's 
readiness would be a strategic win for Beijing, potentially expanding its own spheres of 
influence in the process. What has emerged, at least as a minor but significant indicator, is that at 
the very minimum China appears to be buying silence and at worst, compliance. It is likely this 
has not escaped Beijing's eyes but has in fact been a strategic cornerstone of their foreign 
investment strategy all along. 
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